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Articles
Lawrence L. Herman* Proof of Offshore Territorial
Claims in Canada
I. The Problem
The territorial sea of Canada consists of a 12-mile belt of maritime
space extending seaward from the Canadian maritime coastline. I By
virtue of international law, this 12-mile maritime belt is considered
to be part of the territorial domain of the littoral state. 2 As a
consequence, the legal limits of Canadian territory extend beyond
the low water line along the coasts of Canada to include the area of
the 12-mile territorial sea. 3
*A member of the Saskatchewan and Ontario Bars. The author is a former member
of the Department of External Affairs, now in private practice in Ottawa. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author and not of the Department of
External Affairs.
1. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-7, as amended by
R.S.C. 1970, 1st Supp., Chapter 45. Section 3(l) of the Act provides:
... the territorial sea of Canada comprises those areas of the sea having, as their
inner limits, the baselines described in section 5 and, as their outer limits, lines
measured seaward and equidistant from such baselines so that each point of the
outer limit line of the territorial sea is distant twelve nautical miles from the
nearest point of the baseline.
The determination of the outer limits of the 12-mile territorial sea of Canada is in
reality a more complex matter, as will be shown below, than merely measuring a
distance of 12 nautical miles seaward from the low water line along the coast or
from the baselines of the territorial sea.
2. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 516 U.N.T.S.205
(Geneva, 29 April 1958, Article 1.) Although Canada is not a party to the
Convention, it is widely recognized that the Convention has codified customary
law respecting the territorial sea. In its practice, Canada has accepted this view.
Article 1 of the Convention provides that "the sovereignty of a state extends,
beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast,
described as the territorial sea". There is a wealth of literature on the origin and
development of the concept of the territorial sea. For a useful. summary, see:
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (3rd ed., 1979) at 183-186.
3. It must be noted that Article 1 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea does not
state the precise limits of (i.e., the breadth of) the territorial sea, due to the inability
of the International Law Commission in its preparatory work leading up to the 1958
U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, and of the Conference itself, to agree on the
matter. A subsequent Conference, convened in 1960 largely to deal with the
unresolved issue of the breadth of the territorial sea, also failed to reach agreement
on this issue. While the breadth of the territorial sea is left open under the 1958
Convention, the draft Law of the Sea Convention (A/Conf.62/W.P. lO/Rev.3, 22
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In addition to the territorial sea, there are vast maritime areas
adjacent to and beyond the low water line along the east, west and
arctic coasts of Canada that are deemed to be part of Canadian
territorial domain under international law. These areas, legally
distinct from the territorial sea, comprise: first, the bays, estuaries
and other similar waters that are known as inland waters of Canada
and that are found immediately beyond the low water mark;4 and
second, the category of waters called internal waters of Canada. 5
These latter areas - the non-inland, internal waters of Canada - in
general terms consist of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Bay of Fundy
on the east coast; Queen Charlotte Sound, Hecate Strait and Dixon
Entrance on the west coast; and the waters of the Arctic archipelago
in the arctic. 6 It is these areas of water that are the primary focus of
this article.
The issue addressed in this article is not the validity of Canada's
sovereignty over these coastal waters vis-a-vis other states as a
matter of international law. Rather, the question which this article
examines is the manner in which courts in Canada might deal with
the proof of Canadian claims to these areas under the municipal
(i.e., domestic) law of Canada.
Sept. 1980), Article 3, produced at the 3rd U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, sets
the maximum breadth of the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles.
4. Under international law, all waters on the landward side of the baseline of the
territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the state: Convention on the
Territorial Sea, Article 5. Given the accepted method of drawing baselines as set
out in Article 4 of the Convention, waters in deeply indented coastal areas (i.e.,
bays, gulfs, estuaries, etc.) would normally be on the landward side of the
baselines of the territorial sea and hence subsumed within the category of internal
waters. In addition, waters enclosed in bays, the natural entrance points to which
are less than 24 miles across, and waters in historic bays are also part of the internal
waters of a state, by virtue of Article 7 of the Convention. International law does
not distinguish as such between "inland" waters and "internal" waters.
Generally, international law recognizes all waters enclosed within the baselines of
the territorial sea, or in bays the natural entrance points of which are less then 24
miles wide or in historic bays, to be internal waters of the state concerned, whether
these consist of fresh-water lakes and rivers or salt-water coastal areas.
5. As explained below, the distinction between inland waters of Canada and
internal waters of Canada derives not from international law but from Canadian
statute.
6. The Customs Act definition of "internal waters" and the definition of the same
term in the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act are identical save in one
important aspect, noted below. The definition of the term "inland waters" under
the Customs Act - i.e., all the rivers, lakes and otherfresh water areas of Canada
- makes it clear that the waters off the east, west and arctic coast of Canada can
not fit the definition of "inland waters" and must therefore be in another category
of waters under Canadian law. Are they internal waters?
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Clear though the status of these so-called special bodies of water
may appear to be under international law, the nature and extent of
Canadian sovereign claims to these maritime areas under Canadian
municipal law have never been made clear. Although various
statements made by or on behalf of successive Canadian
governments have indicated that Canada regards these areas as part
of Canadian territory and under full Canadian sovereignty as a
matter of national policy, existing Canadian statutes leave uncertain
both the nature and extent of Canadian sovereignty and jurisdic-
tional claims over these waters. Under such circumstances, what
would be the likely result if the matter were ever squarely faced by a
Canadian court?
In the event of litigation directly or indirectly requiring judicial
interpretation of the extent of Canadian territorial domain over
bodies of water adjacent to the several coasts of Canada, the courts
will rely heavily on Canadian legislation. Given that Canadian
statutes do not seem to provide a sufficient basis for determining
either the nature or extent of Canadian sovereignty over the internal
waters of Canada, as will be demonstrated below, the question
arises as to how the matter of Canadian sovereignty over the above
referred-to areas will be proven.
II. Canadian Claims to the Special Bodies of Water
The waters of the Arctic archipelago have long been claimed by the
government of Canada as internal waters of Canada. 7 Nevertheless,
over the years, the exact position of the government on the matter of
the legal status of Canadian arctic waters and on the precise limits of
the arctic water areas claimed to be under Canadian sovereignty has
not been as clear as one might have hoped. Statements by
successive Ministers of the Crown have indicated that the arctic
waters generally are deemed to be internal waters of Canada and are
claimed to be part of Canadian territorial domain as a consequence. 8
7. For an examination of the history and nature of Canadian claims to the waters of
the Arctic Archipelago, see Inch, "An Examination of Canada's Claim to
Sovereignty in the Arctic" (1962), 1 Man. L.S.J.31; Head, "Canadian Claims to
Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic Islands" (1963), 9 McGill L.J. 200; Byrne,
"Canada and the Legal Status of Ocean Space in the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago" (1970), 28 U. ofT. Faculty L. Rev. 1; Green, "Canada and Arctic
Sovereignty" (1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev. 740; Reid, "The Canadian Claim to
Sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic" (1974), 12 C.Y.I.L. 3; and see
Particularly, Pharand, The Law of the Sea of the Arctic (Ottawa: U. of Ottawa
Press, 1973), Part III.
8. For several years, however, there was considerable debate and discussion over
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The most precise official statement on the legal status of Canadian
arctic waters in recent years was made by the then Secretary of State
for External Affairs, Mr. MacEachen, on May 22, 1975 before the
House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and
National Defense, when he said, explaining the implications for
Canada of the draft Law of the Sea Conference texts on transit
passage through international straits:
...the provisions define the straits as only those which are used
for international navigation and exclude straits lying within the
internal waters of a state. As Canada's northwest passage is not
used for international navigation and since Arctic waters are
considered by Canada as being internal waters, the regime of
transit does not apply to the Arctic. We are therefore able to
continue to enact and enforce pollution control regulations in that
area. 9 (emphasis added)
The foregoing statement has clarified to a large degree the question
of status: but it still leaves open the question of the geographic limits
to Canada's sovereign claim to arctic waters. The area of the
Canadian arctic claimed by Canada as internal waters would appear
to be the waters within an imaginary line extending from the
northern tip of Labrador across Hudson Strait and following the
outer perimeter of the Arctic archipelago from east to west, across
Lancaster Sound on the east and McClure Strait and Amundsen Gulf
on the west until it meets the low water mark of the Northwest
Territories at Cape Bathurst (see figure 1). It is not clear from the
statements referred to, however, whether in law the exact extent of
whether Canada's arctic waters claims were based on the sector theory. This
approach seems largely discredited today. As Head has pointed out (supra, note 7,
at 210) after reviewing the history of ministerial statements regarding the Arctic:
"Few Canadian policies have been so inconsistently or unhappily interpreted over
the years as that pertaining to the Arctic frontiers. The most recent statements
indicate that Canada now relies in the last instance upon effective occupation".
When asked in the House of Commons in 1969 whether Canada accepted the sector
theory, the Prime Minister replied: "I believe the sector theory applies to the sea
bed and the shelf. It does not apply to the waters. " (emphasis added). Can. H.C.
Deb., Vol. VI, (1969), at 6396.
9. Statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs before the House of
Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 22 May
1975, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on
External Affairs and National Defence, Issue No. 24, p. 6 . This statement should be
contrasted with the words contained in a Canadian diplomatic note dated April 16,
1970, to the U.S. government, wherein it is stated, "With respect to the waters of
the Arctic Archipelago, the position of Canada has always been that these waters
are regarded as Canadian." (emphasis added). Reproduced in (1971) 9 C.Y.I.L.
293.
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the arctic area claimed by Canada is to be so delineated. Should the
issue arise in the course of litigation, the initial question for any
Canadian court to ask will be - what do Canadian statutes say?
Similarly, on the east coast, the Canadian Government has stated
that it regards the waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence as internal
waters of Canada and hence under complete Canadian sovereignty.
A press communiqu6 issued on March 6, 1975 on behalf of the
government by the Secretary of State for External Affairs affirmed
this position in clear terms. 10 It can be assumed from the foregoing
communiqu6 - although it is not expressly stated - that the waters
of the Gulf of St. Lawrence claimed as internal waters of Canada are
those waters enclosed by lines drawn across Cabot Strait between
Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia, and Cape Ray, Newfoundland,
and across the Strait of Belle Isle, between Newfoundland and
Labrador in the north (see Figure 2). In addition, on the east coast,
the Bay of Fundy has long been claimed as internal waters of
Canada largely on the basis of historic title." Although the
geographic construction is somewhat more complex, the waters of
the Bay of Fundy that are considered to be part of Canada's internal
waters could be said to be all those waters bounded by a notional
straight line drawn across the mouth of the Bay from Brier Island to
Machias Seal Island (see Figure 3). In the case of both the Gulf of
St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy these notional lines would
presumably follow the so-called fishery closing lines promulgated
in 1971 when Fishing Zones 1 and 2 were created off the east coast
of Canada under the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act. 12
On the west coast of Canada, certain coastal waters are also
deemed to be internal waters of Canada and subject to similar
treatment. Thus, the waters of Queen Charlotte Sound, Hecate
Strait and Dixon Entrance are also claimed as part of Canadian
territorial domain as internal waters of Canada, the outer limits of
which would likely follow or be coterminous with fisheries closing
lines used to create Fishing Zone 3.13 The waters of the Strait of
10. Reproduced, in part, in (1976), 14 C.Y.I.L. 324.
11. The most useful review of the legal basis for Canada's assertion of title over
the Bay of Fundy can be found in Lafotest, "Canadian Inland Waters of the
Atlantic Provinces and the Bay of Fundy Incident" (1963), 1 C.Y.I.L. 149; see
also Laforest, Natural Resources and Public Property under the Canadian
Constitution (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1969).
12. Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 1, 2 and 3) Order, P.C. 1971-366, 25
February, 1971 (Canada Gazette Part II, Vol. 105, No. 5 (10/3/71).
13. British Columbia contests the view that these west coast waters are internal
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Juan de Fuca, Georgia Strait, Johnstone Strait and Queen Charlotte
Strait would also fall under such a claim as internal waters of
Canada. 14 (see Figure 4).
None of the foregoing coastal areas has been specifically defined
by Canadian statute as internal waters of Canada. Under Section
3(2) of the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, "internal waters
of Canada" are merely defined in broad terms as follows:
The internal waters of Canada include any areas of the sea that
are on the landward side of the baselines of the territorial sea of
Canada.
The Act does not go further than this. It does not specify the precise
geographic areas adjacent to the coasts of Canada that are legally
within the statutory definition of internal waters of Canada. It leaves
the determination of those coastal areas that are internal waters of
Canada to a complex set of deductions, supplemented by statements
of government policy, some of which have been referred to above.
It is important also to bear in mind, as noted supra, that under the
law of Canada the "internal waters" of Canada are legally distinct
from "inland waters" of Canada, although the former include the
latter. Inland waters are not defined under the Territorial Sea and
Fishing Zones Act. As a statutory term, "inland waters" is defined
in the Customs Act' 5 to mean:
waters of Canada, beyond the limits of the province, and that their status was
settled by the B.C. Offshore Mineral Rights Reference, [1967] S.C.R. 792. The
B.C. government recently announced that it intends to exercise jurisdiction over the
petroleum and gas resources in these areas. See: Globe & Mail, Toronto, June 3,
1981.
14. The question arises, of course, whether the west coast bodies of water can be
subsumed within the classification of historic waters under international law. This
is an extremely complex issue and requires separate consideration of the history of
each of Dixon Entrance, Hecate Strait and Queen Charlotte Sound. The Dixon
Entrance problem involves an examination of the legal status of the so-called A-B
line, on which see: Bourne and McRae, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon
Entrance: The Alaska Boundary Re-examined" (1976), 14 C.Y.I.L. 175. There is
the separate question as well as to whether straight baselines can be drawn across
the west coast bodies of water under the doctrine enunciated by the International
Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p.
116, and now codified in Article 4 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea.
As to the status of these waters under Canadian (as opposed to international) law,
the matter is complicated by the fact that the British Columbia Court of Appeal on a
reference, held (Seaton, J.A. and McIntyre, J.A. dissenting) that the waters of
Georgia Strait et al. between Vancouver Island and the mainland were inside the
boundaries of British Columbia and were therefore not subject to federal
ownership: Reference Re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related
Areas, [1977] 1 B.C.L.R. 97.
15. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-40, as amended.
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. . .all the rivers, lakes and other fresh waters in Canada and
includes the St, Lawrence River as far seaward as straight lines
drawn,
(a) from Cap des Rosiers to the western-most point of Anticosti
island aixd
(b) from Anticosti Island to the north shore of the St. Lawrence
River along the meridian of longitude sixty-three degrees
west.
Thus, internal waters of Canada as defined by the Territorial Sea
and Fishing Zones Act include inland waters, the latter being, in
general terms, all fresh water areas, the former, pursuant to the
definition in the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, including
both inland waters (i.e., all fresh water areas) and all other waters
on the landward side of the baselines of the territorial sea of Canada.
Internal waters therefore may include but are also distinct from and
may extend beyond the limits ol Canadian inland walers.
The Customs Act and the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act
make it clear that the term "internal waters of Canada" means both
the areas of the sea that are on the landward side of the baselines of
the territorial sea of Canada as well as the inland waters of Canada.
Curiously, the definition of "internal waters of Canada" under the
Customs Act differs from the definition of the same term under the
Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act. Under the Customs Act, the
"internal waters of Canada" are defined as follows:
• . internal waters of Canada means
(a) any areas of the sea that are on the landward side of the
baselines of the territorial sea of Canada, and
(b) the inland waters of Canada. (emphasis added)
On the other hand, as noted supra, under the definition in the
Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act:
. . .internal waters of Canada include any areas of the sea that are
on the landward side of the baselines of the territorial sea of
Canada (emphasis added).
The discrepancy in the definition of "internal waters of Canada" in
the two pieces of legislation is not without legal significance. If, as
in the Customs Act, the term "internal waters of Canada" is found
to mean - i.e., to be - those waters on the landward side of the
baselines of the territorial sea of Canada, the coastal areas
susceptible to fitting within the statutory definition is straightfor-
ward and precise: internal waters of Canada can only be those
waters landward of territorial sea baselines. Conversely, in the
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absence of baselines, there can be no waters which fit within the
Customs Act definition of internal waters of Canada. On the other
hand, the definition in the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act is
wider in scope, for under the latter, "internal waters of Canada"
include waters on the landward side of the baselines, and a fortiori
can also include waters where no baselines have been made. Thus,
areas of the sea adjacent to Canadian coasts where no territorial sea
baselines have been made may also come within the scope of the
definition of internal waters of Canada depending upon whether one
uses the definition of "internal waters" under the Customs Act, on
the one hand, or under the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act,
on the other.
In the event of conflict between the two definitions, it is
submitted that the definition of internal waters of Canada in the
Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act should prevail. The purpose
of this Act is to define the limits of offshore maritime areas over
which Canada exercises sovereignty (internal waters and the
territorial sea) and jurisdiction (fishing zones of Canada) and within
which the laws of Parliament apply. The latter statute is thus more
directly pertinent to defining the limits of Canada's internal waters
than the Customs Act and would likely be so regarded by the courts
in the event of conflict in respective definitions. Moreover, under
Section 2 of the Customs Act, the definitions as set out are expressly
declared to be definitions restricted to the Customs Act or to other
laws relating to customs. 16 The latter Act is therefore restricted in
its scope to a particulay subject matter (i.e., zustoms matteys) and
the definitions used therein should be restricted in similar fashion to
customs-related purposes. The governing statute, therefore, for
purposes of establishing the inner limit to the territorial sea - and
hence the outer limit to internal waters of Canada - is the
Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act.
Assuming, then, that the prevailing municipal law definition of
internal waters of Canada - which are maritime areas under full
Canadian sovereignty and part of Canadian territorial domain by
virtue of interntional law - is the definition found in the Territorial
Sea and Fishing Zones Act, the first question that arises in
determining the limits of Canadian maritime sovereignty is whether
there exists in any given maritime area a baseline of the territorial
16. Section 2 of the Act reads, in part, "In this Act, or in any other law relating to
customs..." and goes on to define several terms as set out.
Proof of Offshore Territorial Claims in Canada 11
sea of Canada. If a baseline exists, then the answer is simple: any
area of the sea that is landward of (i.e., within) such baseline is, by
statutory definition, an area of internal waters of Canada and part of
Canadian territorial domain. In such case, problems respecting
proof of territorial claims do not arise. It is only when statutory
baselines do not exist that proof of sovereignty and of offshore
territorial delimitation become much more complicated. The focus
of this article is to examine the legal basis for proving that these
waters - in the absence of territorial sea baselines - are by law
internal waters of Canada.
III. Territorial Sea Baselines
What is meant by a baseline of the territorial sea? Baselines have
been a term of art long used by hydrographers for constructing the
Xad v d . ., izma_) Umis cf tht te- yAl st bzk thm&
surrounds the littoral state. 17 The 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea, 8  which has been generally accepted as a
codification of customary international law with respect, inter alia,
to baselines, 19 provides, by Article 3:
Except where otherwise provided in this article, the normal
baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low
17. In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (supra, note 1) the Court took note of
the fact that it is the low-water mark which has generally been adopted in the
practice of states for purposes of measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. It also
rule was the method of the tracdparallle (following the coast in all its sinuosities),
where the coastline was deeply indented and cut into, however, or where it is
bordered by an archipelago, an alternative method of drawing baselines was
required (pp. 128-129). The alternative methods which the Court examined were,
firstly, the arc of circles method (which it described as "not obligatory by law")
and second, the straight baselines method (which as in the case of the Norwegian
decree of 1935, the Court held "does not therefore infringe the general law") (at
129 and 133). The Court rejected the U.K. argument that customary law, supported
by draft codes formulated by several learned bodies, required territorial sea
baselines to follow the low-water mark along the actual coastline. See: Waldock,
"The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case" (1951), 28 B.Y.I.L. 114.
18. Supra, note 2.
19. In its commentary on what was then Article 5 of the 1955 draft convention,
which Is the basis ior the present Convention on the 'Teriftofiai Sea, the
International Law Commission affirmed that in drafting the provision it had used as
a basis the judgement of the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case; Report of
the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission (1955), Vol. II. It is generally agreed that the
judgement was a declaration of the state of customary law in respect of territorial
sea baselines.
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water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts
officially recognized by the coastal state.
In addition, consistent with the judgement of the International Court
of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 20 the Convention
also provides, in Article 4:
1. In localities where the coast line is deeply indented and cut
into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its
immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining
appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the
sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked
to the land domain to be subject to the r6gime of internal waters.
Although Canada is a signatory, it is not a party to the 1958
Convention on -the Territorial Sea, not having ratified the
Convention. Nonetheless, recognizing the fact that Articles 3 and 4
of the Convention have codified certain pre-existing rules of
customary international law, baselines put in place by Canada by
Order in Council under the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act,
first along the coasts of Labrador and Newfoundland in 1967,21 then
along the coast of Nova Scotia, Vancouver Island, and the Queen
Charlotte Islands in 1969,22 were drawn consistent with the method
set out in the 1958 Convention (see Figures 5 and 6).
The baselines promulgated under the Territorial Sea and Fishing
Zones Act in 1967 and 1969 (and consolidated in 1972)23 do not
cover all coastal areas of Canada, as shown on the maps in Figures 5
and 6. Territorial sea baselines under the Act have not been drawn
across the Gulf of St. Lawrence or across the Bay of Fundy, or
across the special bodies of water on the west coast. Nor have
territorial sea baselines been drawn around the perimeter of the
Arctic archipelago to set out in legal terms that part of the waters of
the arctic that the Canadian Government has claimed as internal
waters of Canada.
20. Supra, note 14.
21. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Geographical Coordinates (Areas 1, 2 and
3) Order, P.C. 1967-2025, 26 October 1967, Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 101
(SOR/67-543).
22. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Geographical Coordinates (Areas 4, 5 and 6)
Order, P.C. 1969-1109, 29 May 1969, Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 103
(SOR/69-278).
23. Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates Order, P.C. 1972-766, May 9, 1972,
Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 106, No. 10 (SOR/72-151).
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Certain lines have been drawn across the mouth of the Gulf of St.
Lawrence (in the Strait of Belle Isle and in Cabot Strait), across the
mouth of the Bay of Fundy and across the areas of the west coast
bodies of water in 1971. These lines are not baselines under the
Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act. These lines have been drawn
to define the limits of the fishing zones of Canada pursuant to the
Act and not for purposes of delimiting the baselines of the territorial
sea of Canada.2 4 The fishing zones thus created are largely
coterminous with the coastal waters claimed as internal waters of
Canada (see Figures 7 and 8). Nevertheless, because these bodies of
water, as well as the waters of the Arctic archipelago, have not been
enclosed by territorial sea straight baselines under the Territorial
Sea and Fishing Zones Act, the issue of the proof of the sovereign
character of these waters under municipal law of Canada may
someday arise in litigation in the Courts of Canada. 25 Here, the
resolution of the issue will depend largely upon Canadian statute
and, in the absence of clear statutory direction, upon proof of
sovereignty which the courts will deal with under common law
rules.
IV. Proof of Fact by Means of a Crown Certificate
Section 5, subsection 3 of the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act
provides that:
In respect of any other area and until such time as geographical
24. Under Section 5A of the Act, the Governor in Council prescribed as fishing
zones of Canada certain areas of the sea adjacent to the coast of Canada bounded by
straight lines joining the geographical coordinates as set out in the Order-in-
Council: Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 1,2 and 3) Order, P.C. 1971-366, 25
February, 1971 (Canada Gazette, Part I1, Vol. 105, No. 5 (SOR/71-81). These
straight lines joining the said geographical coordinates are not defined as such in
either the Act or the Order, but are commonly known as "fishery closing lines".
25. The status of Canadian arctic waters has indeed been raised in recent litigation
wherein the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories to
permit service ex juris on the defendant and to grant several ex parte orders
affecting exploratory permits in the Beaufort Sea was challenged: BP Exploration
Company (Libya) Limited v. Nelson Bunker Hunt, unreported decision of Tallis, J.
(June 23, 1980). One of the submissions of the defendant in this case was that the
offshore area where the permits were located (40 to 50 miles offshore) were not part
of the Northwest Territories and that the defendant therefore had no assets within
the jurisdiction of the Court. Tallis, J. held that first, the offshore areas involved
were within the statutory definition of Northwest Territories and, secondly, that the
lands underlying the Beaufort Sea were in any case within the territorial limits of
Canada on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court of the Northwest
Territories inR. v. TootalikE4-321 (1969), 71W.W.R. (N.S.) 435.
14 The Dalhousie Law Journal
coordinates of points have, for such other area, been listed in a
list issued pursuant to subsection (1), baselines remain those
applicable immediately before the 23rd day of July, 1964.
The effect of the foregoing is that where an Order in Council
making territorial sea baselines has not been made under Section 5,
subsection (1) of the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, the
applicable baselines are those existing prior to July 23, 1964. Is
there anything to suggest that the baselines "applicable immediately
before July 23, 1964" are not baselines following the low water line
along the coasts? What other baselines existed under Canadian law
prior to that date? Unless such baselines can be demonstrated to
have been in existence prior to that date, it would seem to follow
that the applicable baselines in the areas of the special bodies of
water, including the waters of the arctic archipelago, would be the
low water line along the coast. The result of such a line of reasoning
would be that in the absence of proof to the contrary the territorial
sea of Canada would extend outward from the coastline in these
areas for 12 nautical miles. The area beyond the territorial sea
clearly, therefore, would be high seas. As a consequence, there
would be high seas areas in each of the special bodies of water, a
view which is inconsistent with stated Canadian government policy.
Thus, recourse to legislation alone will not provide the complete
answer in a case in which the issue to be determined by the courts is
whether a given maritime area is part of the internal waters of
Canada, whether it is part of the territorial sea of Canada or whether
it is high seas bey otnd the tettito3riat sea. Because there mre good
grounds upon which to argue that the areas claimed by the Crown in
Right of Canada as part of the territorial domain of Canada (i.e.,
either as internal waters or as territorial sea) can exist independently
of legislation, the issue thereby becomes one of proving the legal
validity of such claims to the satisfaction of a Canadian court.
It is submitted that, in the absence of clear statutory direction, the
word of the executive as to the extent of Canadian territorial domain
when such a question is before the Courts is of great weight and in
certain cases is sufficient in itself to answer the question of law and
of fact. However, while this proposition seems supportable on the
basis of judicial precedent, it is only sustainable up to a point, in
light of the accepted doctrine in R. v. Keyn 26 and in light of the
limits to which staternents by the executive have been applied in like
26. (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63.
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instances of offshore claims in the English courts.
At common law there is a long history of presentation by officials
of certificates on behalf of the Crown which are accepted by the
Courts as conclusive evidence of the facts therein stated, although,
as Phipson has noted, the cases which have allowed such certificates
or statements are neither uniform nor satisfactory.2 7 The modem
line of cases admitting executive certificates as conclusive proof
begins with Mighell v. Sultan of Jahore28 and includes the
well-known case of Duff Development Co. v. Kelantan.2 9 In the
latter, a certificate from the Secretary of State was held to be
conclusive evidence of the independence of a foreign sovereign.
30
In the famous case of Engelke v. Musmann, 31 a statement made to
the court by the Attorney General of England was found to
constitute conclusive evidence of the status of a person claiming
immunity from judicial process on the ground of diplomatic
privilege.
In Chateau-Gai Wines Ltd. v. Institut National des Appellations
d'Origine des Vins et Eaux-de-Vie, 32 the Secretary of State for
External Affairs of Canada provided the court with a certificate to
the effect that even though the 1933 Canada-France Trade
Agreement was never ratified by the two Governments, it was
nevertheless considered by Canada and France to be in force
between them. While not giving the matter of the evidentiary value
of a certificate the analysis which the issue perhaps warranted,
Pigeon, J., for the majority, gave the following opinion:
In the case at bar, I do not consider it necessary to decide whether
one should go so far as to say that a certificate from the
appropriate Minister is conclusive proof that an agreement exists.
27. Phipson on Evidence (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1970), (1 th ed.) at 1205.
28. (1894) 1 Q.B. 149 (C.A.).
29. (1924) A.C. 797; [1924] All E. R. Reprint 1.
30. Viscount Finlay stated as follows:
There are a great many matters of which the court is bound to take judicial
cognisance, and among them are all questions as to the status and boundaries of
foreign Powers. In all matters of which the court takes judicial cognisance the
court may have recourse to any proper source of information. It has long been
settled that, on any question of the status of any foreign Power, the proper
course is that the court shoutd appty to His Majesty's government, and that, in
any such matter, it is bound to act on the information given to them through the
proper Department. Such information is not in the nature of evidence; it is a
statement by the Sovereign of this country, through one of his Ministers, upon a
matter which is peculiarly within his cognisance. Id., at 8.
31. [1928]A.C. 433.
32. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 190; (1975), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 120.
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It is certain that such certificate has this result as regards the value
of the signatories' powers and the authority of the government
they represent. I am inclined to the opinion that the question of
whether the treaty is in force, as opposed to what its effect should
be, is also wholly within the province of the public authority. 33
In a quite separate but related action, which also raised the issue
whether the 1933 Canada-France Trade Agreement was in force,
Chateau-Gai Wines Ltd. v. Attorney General of Canada, 34 Jackett,
P., went much further in examining the legal value of a certificate
from the executive. In an important passage he said:
In my view, the certificate by Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for External Affairs for Canada that 'it was agreed between the
two countries that the trade agreement would enter into force on
Saturday, June 10, 1933', and that 'the two countries have
regarded the agreement as having come into force as of June 10,
1933' should be accepted by this court as conclusive that the
agreement did come into force as a binding international
agreement at that time. In principle, as it seems to me, a
question, whether of fact or law or both, as to whether an
international agreement between Canada and another country has
come into force between Canada and another sovereign power so
as to create international rights and obligations, must be
determined, in case of doubt, in the same way as
(a) a question as to whether a person is a foreign sovereign
power,
(b) a question as to what persons must be regarded as
constituting the effective government of a foreign territory,
(c) a question as to whether a particular place must be regarded
as being in Canada ot as being undtr the authoity o3f a
foreign sovereign authority,
(d) a question as to whether Canada is at peace or at war with a
foreign power, or
(e) a question as to whether a person in Canada is entitled to
diplomatic privileges as being an ambassador of a foreign.
power or a member of the entourage of such an ambassador.
All such questions are questions within the realm of responsibil-
ity of the executive arm of government and, being questions on
which the state should speak with one voice, they are questions
with regard to which the court should accept from the appropriate
minister of the Crown a certificate as to Canada's position. 35
As authorities for the foregoing view of the law, Jackett, P. cited,
inter alia, Mighell v. Sultan of Jahore, Duff Development, Engelke
33. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 199.
34. [1970] Ex. C.R. 366.
35. Id., at 382-383.
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v. Musmann, all referred to supra, as well as, significantly, The
Fagernes. 36 Presumably, reference to The Fagernes was in support
of point (c) of the passage quoted supra - that is, that a certificate
from the executive in Canada is binding on the Courts as to whether
a particular place must be regarded as being in Canada or as being
under the authority of a foreign sovereign authority. This view, of
course, is probably a correct statement of the law. But this
proposition, based on The Fagernes and related cases, is only of use
within carefully drawn limits. It will be for the courts of Canada to
determine those limits, taking into account the factual situation that
obtained in The Fagernes.
The Fagernes involved a collision in the Bristol Channel between
two steamships, one owned by the plaintiffs, the other, the
Fagernes, owned by the defendants. The plaintiffs brought an
action in personam against the Italian owners of the vessel. The
defendants moved to set aside the writ of service on the grounds that
the collision occurred outside British territorial waters and that the
English Admiralty court was therefore without jurisdiction. The
collision occurred in the Bristol Channel, at a place 101/2 to 121/2
miles from the English coast and 71/2 to 91/2 miles from the Welsh
coast. On the motion, Hill, J. held that the location in question was
inter fauces terrae and therefore within the territory of Great Britain
and that consequently the action was within the jurisdiction of the
High Court. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal and
were successful, the Court of Appeal holding itself bound by the
views of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs that the spot where
the collision was alleged to have occurred was not within the limits
to which the territorial sovereignty of the Crown extended.
The decision of the Court of Appeal is interesting on several
grounds. To begin with, the Court appeared reluctant to relinquish
totally its judicial decision-making powers to the views of the
government of the day. Bankes, L.J. was of the opinion that, quite
apart from the statement made on behalf of the Crown, he would not
have found the location in question to be part of the realm,
distinguishing the Fagernes situation from the earlier decision in
Cunningham's Case3 7 which had held that "the whole of the inland
sea between the counties of Somerset and Glamorgan is to be
considered within the counties by the shores of which its several
36. [1927] Probate 311 (C.A.).
37. R. v. George Cunningham et al. (1859), Bell 7 1.
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parts are respectively bounded." '3 8 Bankes, L.J., in his words,
"should have hesitated in accepting (Hill, J's) conclusion, because
it appears to me that the court in Cunningham's Case had not to
consider the circumstances of the present case, where the width of
the channel is so much greater, and there is an entire absence of
anything indicating effective occupation. . .".9 Having thus
expressed his opinion, the learned judge went on to state that "it is
not, however, necessary to express a decided opinion on this
question" because it involved a matter on which it was necessary to
seek the views of the Attorney General!4o The Attorney General
having advised the Court that the Crown did not claim the particular
point in the Bristol Channel as being part of the territory of Great
Britain, Bankes, L.J. said:
This information was given at the insistence of the Court, and for
the information of the Court. Given under such circumstances,
and on such a subject, it does not in my opinion necessarily bind
the Court in the sense that it is under an obligation to accept
it . ..
Having regard, however, to the position given to the Court by the
Attorney-General, to absence of authority and to the general
trend of the more recent opinion on the question of limiting the
width of the fauces terrae to which the. rule of territorial
jurisdiction should apply, I think the court ought to be guided by
the information given to the Court by the Attorney-
General .... 41 (emphasis added)
Bankes, L.J.'s seemingly reluctant acquiescence to the "guidance"
given to the Court by the Attorney-General was not matched by
Atkin, L.J., largely for reasons of public policy. The learned
justice, perhaps as a remonstrance to the views of his brother judge,
held as follows:
What is the territory of the Crown is a matter of which the Court
takes judicial notice. . .Any definite statement from the proper
representative of the Crown as to the territory of the Crown must
be treated as conclusive. A conflict is not to be contemplated
between the Courts and the Executive on such a matter where
foreign interests may be concerned, and where responsibility for
protection and administration is of paramount importance to the
Government of the country. . .I consider that statement binds the
Court, and constvaint it tW decide that this pQ or(io caf the Bifistl
38. Id., at 86.
39. Id., note 36 at 322.
40. Id., at 322.
41. Id., at 323.
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Channel is not within British jurisdiction, and that the appeal
must be allowed.42 (emphasis added)
Not content with the foregoing, nor with the obiter dicta of Bankes,
L.J., the learned justice went on and added his own obiter to those
of his brother judge:
.. .if I had to decide this case upon the materials before Hill, J.
and the further authorities brought before us, I should have been
inclined to come to the same conclusions as he did.
43
Lawrence, L.J. agreed with his fellow justices as to the duty of the
Court to follow the views of the Crown on whether the location in
question was within the realm. He would not, however, have agreed
with Hill, J. 's views in the court below in following Cunningham's
Case.
The doctrine of The Fagernes languished for over forty years
until it was given new life by the English Court of Appeal in Post
Office v. Estuary Radio.44 In that case, the defendant operated a
radio station on an abandoned part in the Thames River Estuary
more than 3 nautical miles from the opposite coasts. The Post Office
sought and obtained an injunction against the defendants, the trial
judge holding that the point in question was within the internal
42. Id., at 324.
43. Id., at 325.
44. (1968), 2 Q.B. 746. In the first of the series of cases involving Estuary Radio
Ltd., R. v. Kent Justices, Ex parte Lye & others, [1967] 1 All E.R. 560, the
Queen's Bench Division refused to quash the conviction of the appellants under the
U.K. Wireless Telegraph Act, 1949, the majority holding that the expression
"territorial waters", which was not defined in the Act, meant territorial waters as
determined from time to time by the exercise of the Crown prerogative. The issue
in this case was whether Red Sands Tower, being 4.9 nautical miles from the Kent
Coast was within the territorial sea of the U.K. The Crown's position was that,
under the Territorial Waters Order in Council, the territorial sea of the U.K. is to be
measured from low tide elevations in accordance with the 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea, and that on this basis, Red Sands Tower lies within the territorial
sea. The conviction was upheld largely on the view that the extent of offshore
territorial claims is a matter of Crown prerogative (per Lord Parker, C.J.).
Following their conviction, the defendants continued to broadcast, and the Post
Office sought an injunction. In this case, [1967] 3 All E.R. 663, the Crown argued
that the Thames Estuary was a "bay"within the terms of the 1964 Order in Council
and that Red S-ands Towev was within a line oi g the natuwal entrance points of
the bay. The case centred on what were the natural entrance points of the Thames
Estuary. The Court (per O'Connor, J.) accepted the evidence of the experts of the
Crown on this point. The trial judge also found that, alternatively, Red Sands
Tower was within the territorial sea on the basis that the territorial sea was
measured from low tide elevations in the area. The matter of Crown prerogative or
of Crown certificates proving offshore claims was not dealt with by the Court.
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waters of the United Kingdom. The defendants appealed. The
primary issue on appeal was whether the location of the radio station
was within a line joining the natural entrance points to the Thames
Estuary and hence situated in internal British waters. The Court of
Appeal held that it was. Speaking through Lord Diplock, the Court
stated as follows:
It still lies within the preorgative power of the Crown to extend its
sovereignty and jurisdiction to areas of land or sea over which it
has not previously claimed or exercised sovereignty or
jurisdiction. For such extension the authority of Parliament is not
required. The Queen's Courts, on being informed by Order in
Council or by the appropriate minister or law officer of the
Crown's claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction over any place, must
give effect to it and are bound by it. 4 5 (emphasis added)
Does the foregoing judicial statement mean that the executive
alone, in the absence of cfe a- sVatutoy 6ilection, was Ahe authio-fi y to
provide conclusive answers to the question of the extent of offshore
claims? Does the foregoing mean that the Crown itself can decide
through the exercise of the prerogative those bodies of water beyond
the coast that are part of the territorial domain of the state? In the
event of litigation involving the status of the arctic waters of
Canada, or any of the special bodies of water, is Lord Diplock
saying that the federal executive in Canada can advise the courts as
to its view of the matter and that on being so informed the courts
will automatically accept the view of the executive? Can this view
be reconciled with the accepted principle enunciated in R. v. Keyn
4 6
that it is the sole province of Parliament to extend the realm?
45. Id., at 753. Diplocc, L.J. also stated at 754:
The area to which an Act of Parliament or the United Kingdom applies, may
vary too as the Crown, in the exercise of its prerogative, extends its claim to
areas adjacent to the coast of the United Kingdom in which it did not previously
assert its sovereignty.
What is meant by this? Does Diplock, L.J. purport to hold that the territorial extent
to which an Act of Parliament applies can be determined by exercise of Crown
prerogative? Equally puzzling is the reference by Lord Diplock to the effect of the
U.K. becoming party to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, at 756, thus:
... the convention, of which the Court must take judicial notice, thus
constituted a declaration by the Crown of an extension to the area over which it
V13-d ~id I to* e~eCMz XoiXs 1=10nrdy 2tS Vie~~ h t UT&Z6tA~l
Kingdom when the Convention came into force, as it did, on September 10,
1964 - a matter which lies within the sole prerogative power of the Crown
without any constitutional need for the consent of Parliament. (emphasis
added).
46. Supra, note 26.
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V. Extension of the Realm and the Power of Parliament
Several important legal issues are raised but are not satisfactorily
answered by the judgement of Diplock, L. J. in Estuary Radio.
The first series of issues that bears careful examination is the matter
of the exclusive sovereign power of Parliament to extend the realm,
a proposition supported by the majority in R. v. Keyn, and the
relationship of this proposition to the proof of offshore territorial
claims in domestic courts. The second series of issues, directly
related to the first, involves the whole area of Crown prerogative in
relation to cession and acquisition of territory. Let us examine the
first series of issues before turning to the second, beginning with a
consideration of the relevance of R. v. Keyn to offshore territorial
claims.
The issue in R. v. Keyn was whether a German national - the
captain of the German flag vessel Franconia - could be tried by
the English criminal courts as a result of a collision with an English
vessel, the Strathclyde, that resulted in loss of life of a passenger
aboard the Strathclyde. The collision occurred 21/2 miles from the
English coast. The German captain of the Franconia was indicted
and convicted of manslaughter under English law by the Central
Criminal Court. The issue was referred to the Court of Crown Cases
Reserved to determine whether the Central Criminal Court had
jurisdiction to try the Franconia's master. That court, consisting of
thirteen judges, held by a majority of seven to six that the Central
Criminal Court, to which had been transferred the jurisdiction of the
Lord High Admiral, lacked the jurisdiction to try the offence. The
majority held that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the offence
had not occurred within the body of a county of England, which, in
the absence of any statute specificially extending the realm, ended
at the low-water mark. Moreover, the offence did not lie within the
jurisdiction of the Admiral, the Admiral having no jurisdiction to try
offences committed by foreigners on the high seas. Even though the
territorial sea of Great Britain might be part of the territory of Great
Britain as far as international law is concerned, under the common
law the realm ended at the low-water mark. In the absence of an act
of Parliament specifically extending the realm or conferring
criminal jurisdiction on the courts, there was no jurisdiction to try
offences committed on the territorial waters of Great Britain.
The judgements of Cockburn, C.J. and Lush, J. are most often
referred to support the proposition that, in the absence of legislation
to the contrary, the realm of England or of any British dominion
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ends at the low-water mark. Cockburn, C.J. reasoned that since the
Admiral had no jurisdiction over foreigners, whether on the
territorial seas or on the high seas, the Crown would be required to
show that the territorial sea had somehow become incorporated into
British territory in order to provide the basis for criminal jurisdiction
over foreigners. Since the Admiral had no jurisdiction over
foreigners on the territorial sea, and since nothing in the precedents
revealed that English criminal jurisdiction extended beyond the
limits of the realm, was there any basis in law to show that the realm
extended beyond the low-water mark? Answering this question,
Cockburn, C.J. said:
For centuries our judicial system in the administration of the
criminal law has been divided into two distinct and independent
branches, the one having jurisdiction over the land and any sea
considered to be within the land; the other over the sea external to
the land. No concurrent assent of nations, that a portion of what
before was treated as the high sea, and as such common to all the
world, shall now be treated as the territory of the local state, can,
of itself, without the authority of Parliament, convert that which
before was in the eye of the law high sea into British territory,
and so change the law, or give to the Courts of the country,
independently of legislation, a jurisdiction over the foreigner
where they had it not before.
4 7
This point was specifically supported by Lush, J., in a succinct
statement as follows:
I . . think that usage and the common consent of nations, which
constitute international law, have appropriated these waters to the
adjacent State to deal with them as the State may deem expedient
for its own interests. They are, therefore, in the language of
diplomacy and of international law, termed by a convenient
metaphor the territorial waters of Great Britain, and the same or
equivalent phrases are used in some of our statutes denoting that
this belt of sea is under the exclusive dominion of the State. But
the dominion is the dominion of Parliament, not the dominion of
the common law. That extends no further than the limits of the
realm. In the reign of Richard II the realm consisted of the land
within the body of the counties. All beyond low-water mark was
part of the high seas. At that period the three-mile radius had not
been thought of. International law, which, upon this subject at
least, has grown up since that period, cannot enlarge the area of
our municipal law, nor could treaties with all the nations of the
world have that effect. That can only be done by Act of
Parliament. As no such Act has been passed, it follows that what
47. Id., at 197.
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was out of the realm then is out of the realm now, and what was
part of the high seas then is part of the high seas now; and upon
the high seas the Admiralty jurisdiction was confined to British
ships. Therefore, although, as between nation and nation, these
waters are British territory, as being under the exclusive
dominion of Great Britain, in judicial language they are out of the
realm, and any exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a foreign
ship in these waters must in my judgement be authorised by an
Act of Parliament. 
48
The above reasons of Lush, J. were quoted in full by the Supreme
Court of Canada in the Offshore Mineral Rights Reference49 in
support of the view that in the absence of legislation the territory of
the realm - and hence the boundaries of the colony of British
Columbia - terminated at the low-water mark. The same view of
R. v. Keyn was supported by the majority of the High Court of
Australia in New South Wales v. Commonwealth. 50
There has been some criticism of the reading which both the
Supreme Court of Canada and the majority of the High Court of
Australia have accorded to R. v. Keyn. 51 It is contended that, first,
Keyn was decided by a majority of only one judge out of thirteen
and on this basis can hardly be said to be a definitive case for the
proposition referred to; second, that even the several judgements of
the majority judges are far from clear on whether tinder the common
law the territory of Britain ended at the low-water mark, and, third,
that the central issue in the case was really the question of the
jurisdiction of the Admiral and that the decision of the case could
have been reached without deciding that the realm ended at the
low-water mark. 
52
48. Id., at 238.
49. Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] S.C.R. 792, supra,
note 13. In its unanimous opinion, the Court also referred to the obiter dicta of
MacDonald, J. in Re Dominion Coal Company Ltd. (1963), 40 D.L.R. (2d) 593,
wherein the learned judge regarded R. v. Keyn as settling the common law rule that
the territory of the realm ends at low-water mark.
50. (1975), 135 C.L.R. 337; 8 A.L.R. 1. A similar view of R. v. Keyn was taken
in the High Court of Australia in Bonser v. LaMacchia, [ 1969] A.L.R. 741.
51. See: Harrison, "Jurisdiction over the Canadian Offshore: A Sea of
Confusion" (1979), 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. 469.
52. Harrison, rd. Of significance, for purposes of this article, is Harrison's
analysis of Jacobs, J.'s view, one of the majority, in New South Wales. In the
opinion of Jacobs, J., R. v. Keyn did not decide that the Crown through the exercise
of the prerogative could not claim dominion and proprietorship over the territorial
sea. In this opinion the prerogative right over adjacent coastal areas exists
independently of the common law and Parliament. In Harrison's view, Jacobs, J.'s
analysis may be the key to reconciling the acceptance by the Supreme Court of
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In spite of the criticism levelled at the Supreme Court of Canada
for its approval of the majority judgement in R. v. Keyn and in spite
of arguments that the exact ratio in R. v. Keyn is far from certain, it
seems beyond doubt to this writer that the ratio of the case, accepted
by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Offshore Mineral Rights
Reference and by the High Court of Australia in New South Wales,
would be followed in Canada today. Nor, in spite of the view of
those who declaim the endorsement given to R. v. Keyn by the
Supreme Court of Canada, does the latter's view of R. v. Keyn seem
to be patently incorrect. While it may be possible to view Keyn
purely as a matter of admiralty jurisdiction without reference to
whether Parliamentary action is required to extend the realm, there
are good reasons on grounds of policy for requiring extensions to
the sovereign limits of the state to flow from legislative, rather than
executive, action.
From the foregoing it is clear that the realm of Great Britain can
only be extended by an Act of Parliament. This proposition, made
certain by Reference Re Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights,
applies equally in Canada. While, admittedly, R. v. Keyn concerned
the issue of the territorial limits to the jurisdiction of English
criminal courts, the doctrine established in that case, supported by
the Supreme Court of Canada, clearly limits the scope of Diplock,
L.J.'s proposition in Estuary Radio. While the two cases are not
entirely inconsistent, they must be reconciled. Since only
Parliament can extend the realm, it cannot be an acceptable
proposition to simply state, as did Diplock, L.J., that "it stilt lies
within the prerogative power of the Crown to extend its sovereignty
and jurisdiction to areas of land or sea over which it has not
previously claimed or exercised sovereignty or jurisdiction" and
that "for such extension the authority of Parliament is not
required." 5 3 Clearly, Parliamentary authority is required, at the
very least to make certain the jurisdiction of the domestic courts
over acts occurring beyond the low-water mark. And, depending
upon the force of Keyn, Parliamentary authority is required in any
instance where the realm is extended beyond the low-water mark,
Canada of R. v. Keyn with the problematical fact that the Supreme Court of Canada
pointed to no legislative provision actually bringing the territorial sea off British
Columbia into the realm of Canada which, of course, was what the majority in R.
v. Keyn said was necessary.
53. Id., note 45.
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subject only to the exception for waters inter fauces terrae. 
54
The key to reconciling Diplock, L.J.'s broad statement with R. v.
Keyn may lie in the immediately subsequent part of the Estuary
Radio judgement where he says:
When any Act of Parliament refers to the United Kingdom or the
territorial waters of the United Kingdom and not as confined to
the precise geographical area of the United Kingdom or the
territorial waters of the United Kingdom and not as confined to
the precise moment at which the Act received the Royal
Assent... the area to which an Act of Parliament... applies may
vary too as the Crown, in the exercise of its prerogative, extends
its claim to areas adjacent to the coast of the United Kingdom in
which it did not previously assert its sovereignty. 55 (emphasis
added)
What Diplock, L.J. seems to be saying is that, consistent with R. v.
Keyn, it i for Pauaxetmt to e metn th. mat haut th t, whe e,
Parliament has done so - for example, by providing that the
territorial sea shall be part of the territorial domain of the state -
the executive may, by Crown prerogative, determine whether
certain areas such as bays, estuaries, etc., are or are not to be
included within that extension as a result of the application of
technical legal rules. Put another way, it appears that Post Office v.
Estuary Radio may be applied so as to allow the executive in
Canada to inform the Courts as to the limits of Canadian internal
waters or territorial waters, to the extent that this matter is not made
precise by the appropriate legislation. Because the Territorial Sea
and Fishing Zones Act provides that "Internal waters of Canada'
include areas of the sea landward of the baselines of the territorial
sea, it is for the executive to inform the courts, in respect of those
areas where baselines have not been drawn, as to those maritime
areas which by Crown prerogative have been claimed to be within
Canadian territorial domain as part of internal waters of Canada.
54. The history of the common law concept of waters inter fauces terrae -
between the arms of the land - was looked at by the Privy Council in Direct
United States Cable Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-American Telegraph Co. Ltd., et. al.
(1872), 2 App. Cas. 394, although the decision in the case was, in the final
the common law rule. According to Lord Hale, referred to by Lord Blackburn (at
417), inDe Jure Maris: "That arm or branch of the sea which lies within the fauces
terrae, where a man may reasonably discern between shore, is, or at least may be,
within the body of a county, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the sheriff or
coroner."
55. Id., note 45.
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Thus, for example, in the case of Hudson Bay, where baselines
under the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act have not been
drawn, it is open to the Crown to advise the Courts as to the status of
the Bay insofar as the executive is concerned under both domestic
and international law. Upon being so informed, the Courts will
accept as conclusive as to the facts and law the statement made by
the appropriate Minister of the Crown. But the condition sine qua
non of the acceptance of a statement on behalf of the Crown is the
act of Parliament extending the realm, for only Parliament can
legally extend the areas of the realm, as was decided byR. v. Keyn.
VI. Sovereign Claims and the Crown Prerogative
The second set of legal problems raised by the judgement of the
English Court of Appeal in Estuary Radio concerns the Crown
prerogative and its application to offshore territorial claims.
Together with upholding the conclusive value of the Crown
certificate, Diplock, L.J. based his judgement on a view of the
prerogative that would sustain the power of the Crown to claim new
areas of territory without Parliamentary assent. 56 The question is
whether this view is supportable as a matter of law.
The royal prerogative is a complex subject, deeply rooted in the
common law history of England. It stems from the pre-eminence of
the sovereign, but is limited both by common law and statute.
57
With respect to offshore territorial claims, it has been pointed out
that while the Crown has, or once had, a prerogative to erect
beacons, lighthouses and seamayks, to declare ports and ha'ens, to
protect land from inundation by sea water, and by virtue of the
prerogative, has ownership of lands inter fauces terrae, none of
these points convincingly to a prerogative of delimitation. 58 The
same author points out that the possibility of the existence of a
prerogative of delimitation was not even considered in
Cunningham's case, in Keyn's case or in the Conception Bay case
and concludes that it is surprising therefore that the courts in The
Fagernes and Estuary Radio were so ready to accept the view that
56. Thus, the learned judge states: "It still lies within the prerogative power of the
Crown to extend its sovereignty and jurisdiction to areas of land or sea over which
it has not previously claimed or exercised sovereignty or jurisdiction." Id., note
45.
57. See: Vol. 8 Hals. (4th) at 583 et seq.
58. Edeson, "The Prerogative of the Crown to Delimit Britain's Maritime
Boundary" (1973), 89 L.Q.R. 364.
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such a prerogative exists. 5 9 The broad characterization of the
prerogative power asserted by Diplock, L.J. on the basis of The
Fagernes is therefore in some doubt. If it is more correct in legal
terms to view the Crown prerogative as confined to its precise
historical limits respecting ports, harbours and the like, or to sea
areas inter fauces terrae, it may be difficult to convince a Canadian
court to recognize the power of the executive, in the absence of
Parliamentary sanction, to claim expansive offshore areas that are
not - geographically speaking- within the arms of the land.
Related to the matter of the existence or non-existence of a
prerogative of delimitation is the prerogative of the Crown in
respect of foreign affairs, including treaties. In Canada, only the
Crown - the executive branch - can conclude treaties.6 0 The
question, however, is whether this part of the prerogative can
extend so far as to permit the Crown to acquire or cede territory
without express Parliamentary sanction. It appears that, in respect
of cession of territory, Parliamentary authority is required.
6 '
Whether the same is true in respect of acquisition of new territory is
not clear, but there would seem to be little ground on the basis of
public policy for distinguishing between territorial cession and
acquisition. Thus, if it is maintained that treaties of cession require
Parliamentary sanction because they affect the rights of the subject
resident in such territory, 6 2 the same argument would seem to apply
with equal cogency to acquired territory, whether by conquest or
otherwise.
VII. Effect of The Fagernes doctorine on Canadian Claims
In light of the limitations on the Crown prerogative, what then is the
relevance of The Fagernes doctrine to present day Canadian
offshore claims?
The English Court of Appeal in The Fagernes accepted the view
that it is for the Crown to advise the courts as to the extent to which
certain bodies of water are claimed to be within the realm and under
the sovereignty of the Crown. Upon hearing the views of the
executive, the court will give heed to them. In R. v. Keyn, as noted
above, the Court of Crown Cases Reserved held that only
59. Id., at 370-371.
60. Gotlieb, Canadian Treaty-Making (Toronto: Butterworths, 1968) at 4.
61. Keith, ed., Anson's Law and Custom of the Constitution (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1935), Vol. II, Part II, at 137-142.
62. Id., at 141.
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Parliament could extend the realm and that, whereas by the law of
nations, areas adjacent to the coast may be claimed as part of the
territory of England, the courts could only exercise jurisdiction if
Parliament had adopted the international law rule as part of
municipal law. It was for Parliament and Parliament only to extend
the realm. R. v. Keyn was not referred to by any of the judges in The
Fagernes, although it was cited by counsel for the respondents in
argument. Nor was R. v. Keyn referred to by Diplock, L.J. in
Estuary Radio, although it is hard to believe that the court was not
fully aware of the importance of the decision - however varied the
interpretation of its precise ratio may be - on the law of maritime
space.
One is led to conclude that the holding of R. v. Keyn was
considered not to be relevant to either of the problems which the
court dealt with in The Fagernes or Estuary Radio, Perhaps this is
because in neither case can it truly be said that the court was
recognizing any power of the Crown to usurp Parliamentary
authority and to extend the realm by an act of the royal prerogative
alone. In The Fagernes the central issue was whether the location of
the collision between the two vessels was at a point that was inter
fauces terrae as being within the adjacent county - i.e., within the
realm and subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. In Estuary Radio,
on the other hand, the issue was whether the point at which Red
Sands Tower stood in the Thames Estuary was within the term
"bay" as defined by the Territorial Waters Order in Council, 1964.
In, de-ciding this questianM, the, Cokwt KtAkAd M tt e'Aeace QX eXPelt
Crown witnesses as to what constituted the natural entrance points
to the bay - the Thames estuary - across which baselines could be
drawn under the Order in Council enclosing the waters as internal
waters. There was no question of accepting the views of a Minister
of the Crown as to whether the area in question constituted part of
an area claimed to be within the realm of the United Kingdom. The
case is thus quite distinguishable from The Fagernes. It is
unfortunate that the broad doctrine of The Fagernes was cited by
Diplock, L.J. without analysis as to its precise ratio and without
narrowing the case to its proper limits - that is, whether the area in
question was considered by the Crown to be inter fauces terrae and
part of the adjacent county. It is hard to imagine that The Fagernes
stands for more than this.
As far as Canada's offshore claims are concerned, The Fagernes
can really only stand for the proposition that the courts will
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recognize on the part of the Crown the right to claim - in the
absence of legislation by Parliament - certain limited offshore
waters as being inter fauces terrae under the common law and hence
within the territorial sovereignty of the realm. The Bristol Channel
is an example of such an area. For any area beyond waters inter
fauces terrae, and act of Parliament is required, consistent with R.
v. Keyn.
Would a Canadian court give effect to the views of Ministers of
the Crown regarding Canada's claim to the Bay of Fundy, Gulf of
St. Lawrence, Hecate Strait, Queen Charlotte Sound and Dixon
Entrance and the waters of the Arctic archipelago? The answer
depends largely on the extent to which the courts in Canada would
follow The Fagernes doctrine in a restricted or broad application.
And this in turn will depend upon the degree to which Canadian
courts will also follow the rule in R. v. Keyn regarding the
requirement for Parliament to act to extend the realm. Even
accepting the argument that Parliament has extended the realm by
enacting the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, it is far from
certain that the views of the executive are binding in respect of any
areas that are greater in extent than waters inter fauces terrae.
Where, then, do matters stand insofar as proof of offshore
territorial claims before Canadian Courts are concerned? In the
event that the issue arises during the course of litigation, Canadian
statutes leave open for determination by the courts the outer limits to
Canadian internal waters and the corresponding inner limits of the
territorial sea in those maritime areas adjacent to the east, "west and
arctic coasts of Canada where territorial sea baselines have not been
drawn. In the absence of such baselines, the courts will seek to
obtain the best evidence available regarding the status of the waters
in these maritime areas. As has been demonstrated, there is
considerable risk in leaving everything to the authority of a Crown
certificate, particularly where the body of water of concern is
greater than those waters which the common law regards as inter
fauces terrae.
One obvious and simple solution to this problem would appear to
lie in the drawing of baselines under the Territorial Sea and Fishing
Zones Act to enclose all those bodies of water which are at present
claimed by the Crown as internal waters of Canada. This would
clearly and definitively remove all lingering doubts as to the status
of these waters under Canadian law. There are, it is recognized,
major international relations issues posed by this kind of approach,
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particularly where foreign maritime interests are involved. Other
states - the same that opposed the assertion of jutisdiction at the
time of adoption by Parliament of the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act6 3 - may have an interest in challenging such an
outright assertion of territorial sovereignty over large coastal areas
by Canada. 
64
In light of these political realities, an alternative solution to the
problem might be to amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones
Act to provide that the presentation of a certificate by the executive
in respect of any issue concerning the status or limits of Canadian
internal waters is conclusive proof of the facts as stated therein. This
approach, following a similar approach used in other statutes,
would accomplish the overall objective of ensuring against a
diversion of views between the executive and the judiciary over the
status of the east, west and arctic waters of Canada. It would fill an
important gap in Canadian statute that, if left open, could well result
in a judicial determination at variance with the position which the
federal executive in Canada has taken regarding the status of these
special bodies of water over the course of many years.
63. R.S.C. 1970, 1st Supp., c. 2 .
64. See for example the position of the U.S.A. contained in a statement released
by the State Department on April 15, 1970, following the introduction in the House
of Commons of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Bill and the amendments to
the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, reprinted in part in (1971), 9 C.Y.I.L.
287.
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